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V-22 OSPREY

Reprint of a letter by LtGen Frederick McCorkle reporting on the V-22 Osprey

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V-22 Schematic

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From: McCorkle LtGen Frederick

Fellow GOs/SESers

In our continued effort to keep you informed on the facts surrounding the V-22 Program, we provide you with the following. We are waiting for the results of the SECDEF appointed Blue Ribbon Panel before we engage on many of the points discussed in the media. We cannot (and do not desire to) get out ahead of any of the ongoing investigations or the Panel...with this being said, the facts contained below will assist you in either preparing future talks, or in responding to questions from inside/outside your command or in your local community.

Semper Fi and V/R - John

 

V-22 FACT SHEET

Background: The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has the responsibility for development and management of all Naval Aviation programs, to include the V-22. NAVAIR provides the key interface between the Services who determine the requirements (Marine Corps, Air Force and US Special Operations Command in the case of the V22) and the contractors who build the weapons system to satisfy the requirements. In addition to its own developmental testing conducted at NAS Patuxent River, MD, NAVAIR's program management offices also coordinate with and respond to operational testing or evaluation (OPEVAL) conducted by Fleet activities. The OPEVAL of V-22 was conducted under the auspices of the Commander, Naval Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR). There is a detailed description of the weapons systems development process and the end of this document.

The following information addresses specific issues that have been in the news: Issue: Technology Maturity Facts: Tiltrotor technology is a mature technology. The V-22 Program was based upon a rigorous Milestone process as laid out in Department of Defense acquisition directives and orders. This process requires specific milestones to be met prior to continuation. One of the "maturity" milestones is flight test. The V-22 has accumulated 3,883.3 hours in developmental and operational flight test. With the addition of production aircraft flying in the Fleet Replacement Squadron, the V-22 has over 5000 hours of total flight time in over 11 years of flight.

Issue: Operational Test Waivers

Facts: The V-22 Program Management requested and received 22 operational test waivers at the final review prior to OPEVAL. This is the lowest number of waivers of any aircraft in recent history. By comparison, the waivers for two recently acquired aircraft were 59 and 72 waivers respectively. None of the waivers for the V-22 were safety related and each had a detailed plan in place to address the resolution/fix for the waived item.

Issue: Restructured Baseline Development Flight Test Program

Facts: As is done in the development of all aircraft, a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) was developed and continuously reevaluated for modification. During these modifications, test events or points can be deleted or added. As is customary, the V-22 Osprey TEMP was modified based on a rigorous, integrated process team approach which included Naval Air Systems Command engineers, developmental and operational test pilots, program office representatives, and service representatives (Marine Corps, Air Force and US Special Operations Command.) The process is influenced by numerous factors, not the least of which are safety, mission requirements, and budget. Safety of our Marines is our number one concern.

Issue: Deleted Flight Testing

Facts: The "deleted Test Points" that have been the subject of press reports represent a fraction of the total Test Events and "Test Points" collected during the Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Test events are scheduled for each flight, each one specified number of test points to be collected during the conduct of that event. The purpose is to identify a safe flight envelope for the aircraft. The developmental test for the V-22 was comprised of approximately 2,200 Test Events of which 1,941 where actually flown. This equates to 90 percent of the data test points and those that were not flown were approved during modifications to the TEMP. The end result was the creation of a conservative flight envelope. This flight envelope is the normal flight operations performance window such as speed, angle of bank, rate of descent, etc. Flying the aircraft inside this envelope ensures the safe operation of the aircraft.

Issue: Ability of the V-22 Osprey to Fulfill Marine Corps Requirements

Facts: The aircraft can fly faster, further, and with a greater payload than the requirements laid out in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The aircraft can and has carried 24 combat loaded Marines. Production representative Osprey aircraft carried an load which was 1700 lbs more than the ORD requirement. The Osprey also demonstrated the ability to self-deploy 2100 nm, four hours faster than the ORD requirement. Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force Operational Evaluation report cited 11 enhancing characteristics of the V-22, all of which are unattainable using helicopter technology. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation stated in the Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report: "In the planning and execution of missions, these three improved characteristics of range, speed, and payload can be interchanged and utilized in countless ways. Together they provide a major step ahead in tactical flexibility. "The capability to self-deploy will provide the tactical commander flexibility in combat never before experienced."

Issue: Vortex Ring State

Facts: Every rotorcraft is susceptible to Vortex Ring State (VRS). It can occur at very low forward airspeed and very high rates of descent (less than 40 knots and greater than 800 feet per minute rate of descent). Flight restrictions prohibit operations in this regime for the V-22 and all rotorcraft. Based on test data, current restrictions are very conservative and provide a very large margin for safety. These "restrictions" are part of the normal flight envelope as developed in the initial flight test. Follow-on High Rate of Descent (HROD) testing is approximately 40 percent complete and is expected to conclude during CY 02.

Issue: Proprotor Downwash

Facts: All rotorcraft produce downwash. As the vehicle weight increases so does the amount of downwash. All rotorcraft suffer to some extent from the effects of brownouts and whiteouts along with snow, sand and other debris intrusion to the aircraft interior. OPEVAL Report discussed several techniques that when followed in the V-22, minimize problems related to downwash.

Issue: Risks Associated with Continuing the Program

Facts: The Marine Corps shares the same risk and safety concerns addressed in the media. Because of those concerns, the V-22 is under considerable scrutiny. The Marine Corps is carefully reviewing whether this aircraft should go forward for a full rate production decision. At the request of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Secretary of Defense appointed an independent V-22 Review Panel to inquire into the Osprey programmatics from top to bottom. Specifically, the panel is chartered to look at all aspects of the V-22 Osprey program and recommend corrective actions for any discrepancies noted. The Marine Corps looks forward to the panel's report and the Department of Defense's recommendations.

Summary: The safety of our Marines is our number one concern and on this we will not compromise. The Secretary of Defense appointed the independent V-22 Review Panel to inquire into the Osprey program from top to bottom. Specifically, the panel is chartered to look at all aspects of the V-22 Osprey program and recommend corrective actions for any areas of concern. We look forward to the panel's report and the Department of Defense's recommendations. The fate of this program is important to the future of the military and for the Nation. Ultimately, we owe the families of the Marines who lost their lives in attempting to bring new capabilities to our forces, the full measure of the reasoned examination currently ongoing. There should be, and will be, no rush to judgment. Weapons System Development and Acquisition

The acquisition of a new weapons system within the DoD is a lengthy and detailed process that is based on lessons learned throughout the history of purchasing items for use by the military. The current system progresses from Concept Exploration (Phase 0) to Program Definition and Risk Reduction (Phase I), to Engineering & Manufacturing Development (Phase II), to Production, Fielding/Deployment & Operational Support (Phase III) The majority of testing and evaluation of new weapon systems occurs in Phase II (EMD). Testing here is broken down to Developmental Testing (DT) and Operational Testing & Evaluation (OT). In general, the DT portion of testing establishes the baseline configuration for the production of the aircraft, establishes safe operating envelopes for the aircraft and highlights unique operating characteristics of the aircraft that can be encountered while operating in the safe, established envelope. OT will then assess the ability of the aircraft to perform its intended mission. Both the DT and OT process will identify deficiencies either against a Military Specification or a mission area. Operating envelopes are established during DT through a stair -step approach. That is; operating the aircraft in a known safe area, gradually decreasing/increasing one parameter at time until the limits of operation are established. An example of this is the Height Velocity (HV) Diagram that describes airspeed and altitude combinations that should be avoided.

This "avoid" region can be the result of the aircraft's inability to land safely after loss of power, or that its handling qualities become such that normal operation is not guaranteed, or that the aircraft cannot generate the control power required to recover. When an "avoid" region is established, rarely is the aircraft flown in this region during testing, for by definition, it is in an area that does not guarantee its survival. During testing, a test plan is developed with all possible combinations of data points (test points) established. Depending on the results of previous test points, some test points may be waived or go uncollected. They may be waived because the previous test point described a sufficient amount of data to establish a safe envelope, or after analysis of collected data further testing would not reveal additional useful data.

The focus of developing a safe operational envelope in DT, validate by OT, produces an aircraft that can safely be flown, within its operational envelope, to accomplish its mission after fielding If in DT or OT it is determined that additional operational capabilities are desired, possible Follow-on Testing and Evaluation (FOT&E) can be accomplished to expand operational envelopes. This occurs on virtually every aircraft fielded in the DoD. Constant improvement in capabilities leverages new technology throughout the life of the aircraft. Partnership between Service Headquarters, which establishes the mission requirement, Naval Air Systems Command, which has the task of developing and procuring weapons systems, and Industry, who builds the weapons systems is constant and connected from Concept Development (Phase 0) to Fielding (Phase III).

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